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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(i)

Nature of the case

This case is a dog bite and premises liability case. Rather generic in its facts. it involves
Steve Boswell who had the back of his hand removed by the dog bite; Steve's mother-in-law, Mary
Steele, who harbored the dog 1, Steve's niece, Amber Steele, who owned the dog2, and the dog, Zoey,
who had bitten at least two other people on at least two prior occasions3 •
(ii)

Course of proceedings in the trial court

Plaintiffs brought their action for common law strict liability for dog bite, negligence,
negligence per se, and premises liability. (R. 42-48). Plaintiffs relied on prior Idaho case law, the

Restatement (Second) ofTorts §§ 509 and 513, Restatement (Third) ofTorts § 23, Idaho Code § 252805(2), and Pocatello Municipal Ordinance 6.04.050 and 6.04.060 concerning abnormally
dangerous dogs. Plaintiffs filed for partial summary judgment on two counts and on some of
Defendants' affirmative defenses. (R. 73). Defendants also filed for Summary Judgment. (R. 160).
The trial court disposed of Plaintiffs' case. The trial court handled the Restatements of the

Larr by not addressing them at all. (R. 456-466). The court brushed aside the Idaho statute,
concluding that the two prior bites were insufficient to put the owners on notice that the dog was
abnormally dangerous. (R. 464, L.15-16). The City Ordinance allows only one defense for the ovmer
of a biting dog and that one defense is provocation. The trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that
Steve's holding out his closed hand towards the dog was provocation. (R. 464, L.24).
Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider to no avail.
This matter is now before this Court on Appeal.
(iii)

Concise statement of the facts

On October 8, 2011 Steve Boswell gave his mother-in- law, Mary Steele, a ride, as was his
customary routine whenever she needed a ride. (R. 460, L.20-1). When he brought her home he

1

R. 186-7, L.25-17, pp 16-17

2

R. 184, L. 24-25, of page 6

3

R. 516-517, L. 15-10
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helped her to her door, as was his customary routine whenever he brought her home. (R.460, L.21 ).
When they entered the house, Steve went to the small toddler gate between the living room and the
kitchen, as was his customary routine whenever they entered. (R. 219, L.21 of page 29). There, he
would routinely open the gate and allow Mary's pet Shih Tzu to enter the living room with him and
Mary where they would typically visit a while. (R. 219, L.16-21 of page 29; R. 221, L. 12 of page
36).
On this occasion, something happened that was not routine. Besides Mary's Shih Tzu, a
Scottish Terrier stood on the other side of the toddler gate. (R. 461, L.5). The Terrier belonged to
Steve's niece, Amber Steele. (R. 459 L. 11-12). Amber resided with Mary. (R. 459, L 9-10). The
Terrier was usually kept locked in the basement-and for good reason. (R.460, L. 16-17).
Unbekno\e\TISt to Steve, but soon to be discovered by him, the Terrier had a rather nasty disposition.
wnen Steve offered the Terrier the back of his hand to sniff, the Terrier removed the back of Steve's
hand with its teeth. (R. 461, L. 6-7).
The Terrier had priors. On at least two previous occasions the dog had drawn blood from
its victims. (R. 459-60, L. 15-20). If we include the incident referred to in the letter from the
insurance adjuster, John Billquist, the dog had shovvn abnormally dangerous propensities on at least
three prior occasions. (R. 77).

The undisputed facts are these:
1. Defendant, Mary Steele, owned the property located at 1115 Verdugo in Pocatello, Idaho.
(R. 759, L. 6-8).
2.

Defendant, Amber Steele, was Mary's granddaughter and resided '-vith her at that

address. (R. 459, L. 9-10).
3.

Amber ovvned a Scottish Terrier named Zoey that also resided at Mary's residence.

(R.459,L.11-12).
4.

Mary Steele harbored the dog named Zoey. (R. 186-7, L. 25 of p. 16 - 17 of p. 17).

5.

Prior to the incident where Mr. Boswell was bit on October 8, 2011, there have been

at least two incidents where Zoey had bitten someone. The first knovvn incident, according to the
records, was when Zoey bit Amber's friend, Chris Kettler, at a barbeque party held at Mary's house.
The bite drew blood, and was bandaged. (R. 459-460, L.15-3 ).
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6.

The second kno\\n incident, according to the record, is based on Karina Boswell's

testimony that she witnessed one of Amber's friends got bit by Zoey at a party at Mary's house. The
friend's wound also drew blood. (R. 750, L. 9-10).
7.

There was a gate in the kitchen to keep Mary's dog from making a mess on the

carpet. For the most part, Amber kept Zoey in a room in the basement when Amber was out of the
house. (R. 460, L. 16-17)
8.

Mr. Boswell had spent some time with Zoey before the incident. Zoey let Mr.

Boswell pet Zoey and she had played on Steve's lap. (R. 460, L. 18-19).
9.

On the day of the incident, October 8, 2011, Mr. Boswell gave Mary a ride home after

a visit at the Boswell's home. Mr. Boswell went inside Mary's home with Mary. (R. 460, L. 20-21 ).
10.

When Mr. Boswell and Mary entered the home, Amber was not in the house. Zoey

and Mary's dog were in the kitchen behind the gate, Zoey was barking. (R 461, L. 1-3).
11.

Mr. Boswell walked over to the gate to pet Zoey, who \Vas on the other side of the

gate. He extended his right hand to Zoey. As he reached his hand towards the dog, Zoey bit his hand
and took a hunk of flesh from Mr. Boswell's hand. (R. 461, L. 9-7).
12.

Mr. Boswell \vent to the hospital to have his injuries treated. A report was made by

animal control officer, Tamara Andersen. (R.461, L. 8-12).
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The issues of this appeal are as follows:

ISSUE

1:

Is the Standard in AfcClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Assoc 'n, 17
Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 ( 1909), Pertaining to Injury by Domestic Animals Still
Good Law in Idaho?

ISSUE

2:

Is the Restatement (Second) of Torts,§ 509 (1977) Good Law in Idaho?

ISSUE

3:

Is the Restatement rThird) of Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm,§ 23 (2010) Good
Law in Idaho?

ISSUE

4:

Is the Restarement (Second) a/Torts§ 513 (1977) Good Law in Idaho?

ISSUE

5:

Did the District Court Err in Concluding That Neither Mary Steele Nor
Amber Steele Owed Any Duty to Steve Boswell to Protect Him from Their
Vicious Dog.

ISSUE

6:

Did the District Court Abuse its Discretion in Making Unwarranted
Conclusions of Law That Should Have Been Issues of Fact.

Issue 7:
ISSUE

8:

Appellants' Brief

Did the District Court Err in Striking the Affidavit of Tamara Andersen.
Did the District Court Err in Ruling That an Insurance Adjuster, Who Makes
Himself a Fact Witness, Is Immune from Testi:fying?

4

ATTOR'iEY FEES ON APPEAL

The law of appellate practice requires a party to include any argument for fees in the opening
brief. Plaintiffs recognize that one's assessment of the merits of any case is, to some degree, a matter
of perspective. But plaintiffs are troubled more than usual by the outcome of this case and how that
outcome was reached.
Plaintiffs are troubled by the fact that the trial court in its opinions, and the defense in its
briefing, declined to even mention the Restatements of the Law that seem pertinent to this case.
Plaintiffs are troubled by the fact that the trial court in its opinions, and the defense in its briefing,
declined to even discuss whether Idaho. like forty-seven other states and the District of Columbia,
will hold a dog owner responsible for dog bites that occur when the owner already knows the dog

will bite. Plaintiffs are troubled by the fact that the trial court in its opinions, and the defense in its
briefing, declined to eYen address the authoritative articles and the decisions of other jurisdictions
that interpret JfcClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Assoc'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015
(1909) the same way as plaintiffs do.
Plaintiffs are troubled that the trial court made many findings of fact in favor of the
defendants to whom the court then granted summary judgment.
On an abiding belief that the trial court's decision is indefensible on appeal, plaintiffs ask for
attorney fees to be awarded on this appeal against the defense under Idaho Code § 12-121.
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ARGUl\'IENT

1.

The Standard in McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair& RacingAssoc'n, 17 Idaho 63,104
P. 1015 (1909) Pertaining to Injury by Domestic Animals is Still Good Law in Idaho.

A1cClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Assoc 'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909), is
the authoritative case on animal injury law. In A1cClain the Idaho Supreme Court said:
One of the early cases in this country considering the legal principles involved in the
case at bar, under the facts as alleged in the complaint is that of Decker v. Gammon,
44 Me. 322, 69 Am, Dec. 99, and in our opinion states the rule correctly, as follows:
"If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses, injure any one, in person or property,
if they are rightfully in the place \Vhere they do the mischief, the owner of such
a.riimals is not liable for such injury, unless he knew that they were accustomed to do
mischief; and, in suits for such injuries, such knowledge must be alleged and proved,
for, unless the m1:ner knew that the beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner
had such k:,wwledge, he is liable.
104 P. 1015, at 1020. (Emphasis added).
The J1cClain case is still good Idaho law. Suer v. Valentine, So. CV 2011-2846 (First
Judicial District, 2012 WL 894476 (2012). The AicClain case is cited in several secondary sources
as standing for the position that Idaho is a common law "one bite rule" strict liability jurisdiction.
Liability results when the abnormally dangerous propensities of the offending animal are known to
the O\vner or harborer. At least three other authorities read the AfcClain decision the same way as
Plaintiffs. Allison E. Butler, 33 Causes a/Action 2d 293 (Originally published in 2007); Adam P.
Karp, J.D., M.S. 38 Causes ofAction 2d 281 (Originally published in2008); Georde Duckier, Ph.D.,
Esq. Animal rVrongs: On Holding Animals to (and Excusing Them from) Legal Responsibility for
Their Intentional Acts. 2 J Animal L. & Eth. 91, 121 (2007).
All three reach the same conclusion. Consider the following quotes:
"A person injured by a domestic animal may bring a common-law strict liability
action against the owner or keeper of the animal. McClain v. Lewiston Interstate
Fair & RacingAss'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909). In order to establish a prima
facie case in a common-!Cfl+· strict liability action the plaintiff must prove that he or
she was injured by a domestic animal, that the animal had dangerous propensities,
and that the defendant k...'1ew of the animal's propensities prior to the time the injury
was suffered. The fact that the 0\,vner exercised care in keeping the animal is no
defense. McClain, above."
33 Causes of Action 2d 293 § 52 (Originally published in 2007). (Emphasis added).
Appellants' Brief
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'·Contrast this with Idaho, which establishes common law strict liability witlwut
proofthat the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care: demonstratingscienter
is all that is required. McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Asso 'n, 17
Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909)."
38 Causes ofAction2d281 § 5 [Cumulative Supplement] (Originallypublishedin2008). (Emphasis
added).
"Strict Common Law Liability: A common law strict liability action may be brought
against the owner or keeper of the animal ,tt"cClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair &
Racing Ass 'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909). In order to establish a prima facie
case, the plaintiff must prove injury by a domestic animal, having dangerous
propensities that the defendant knew of prior to the time the injury was suffered. The
fact that the Ov'mer exercised care in keeping the animal is no defense."

38 Causes of Action 2d 281 § 42 (originally published in 2008). (Emphasis added).
Currently, animals- minds, bodies, and all are personal property under the law, and
as with all personal property are treated as having owners. A.nimal o,vners, in tum,
are those upon whose shoulders rest the obligation to adhere to social norms resulting
from ownership. As owned objects, animals are currently free of personal obligation.
In essence, animals have the unfettered freedom to do whatever it is they wish to do
... ; it is those who own the animals who are truly fettered by assuming the legal
responsibility for the animals' actions. 1W"cClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair &
RacingAss'n, 104 P.1015. 1021 (Idaho 1909).
Georde Duckler, Ph.D., Esq. Animal Wrongs: On Holding Animals to (and Excusing Them.from)
Legal Responsibility for Their Intentional Acts. 2 J Animal L. & Eth. 91, 121 (2007). (Emphasis
added)

The 1'1cClain decision has also attained its share of notoriety by the Supreme Courts of other
states. Consider the following:
The essence ofthe action is not ownership, but the keeping and harboring of an animal,
knowing it to be vicious. One who keeps a savage dog is bound to secure it against it doing
mischief. Vide Quilty v. Battie, supra; Oakes v. Spaulding, 40 Vt. 347, 94 Aun.Dec. 404;
Smith v. Royer, 181 Cal, 165, 183 P. 660; 1WcClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing
Ass'nT 17 Idaho 63,104 P.1015, 25 L.R.A., N.S. 691, 20 Ann. Cas. 60; Lannav. Konen,
119 Conn. 646,478 A 425.
Barber v. Hochstrasser, 136 N.J.L. 76, 80, 54 A.2d 458,460 (Sup. Ct. 1947). (Emphasis added)
The gist o{an action for damages by a vicious dog, who propensities are known,
is not negligence in the manner of keeping the dog,· it is keeping the dog at all; and
the action is founded upon the theory of maintenance of a nuisance, not negligence.
Jaco v. Baker, 174 Or. 191, 148 P.2d 938. The essence of the action is not
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ownership, but the keeping and harboring of an animal, knowing it to be vicious.
One who keeps a savage dog is bound to secure it against its doing mischief. Vide
Quiltyv. Battie, [135 N.Y. 201, 32 N.E. 7, 17 LR.A. 521] supra; Oakes v. Spaulding,
40 Vt. 347, 94 Am.Dec. 404; Smith v. Royer, 181 Cal. 165, 183 P. 660; McClain v.
Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63,104 P. 1015, 25 L.R.A.,k
N.S. 691, 20 Ann Cas. 60; Lanna v. Konen, 119 Conn. 646, 178 A 425.' Barber v.
Hockstrasser, 136 N.J.L. 76, 54 A.2d 458,460.

Hunt v. Hazen, 197 Or. 637, 639-40, 254 P.2d 210,211 (1953).
The J,fcClain decision is accepted by other authorities as affirmation that Idaho's position
on the law is, as advocated by the plaintiffs but rejected by the trial court: If an owner or harborer
knows of a dog's abnormally dangerous nature, the owner or harborer is liable for injuries caused.
Of the 50 United States and the District of Columbia, forty-eight are strict liability
jurisdictions. The strict liability jurisdictions are divided into two categories: Those which, by
statute make a dog-owner strictly liable for the injuries caused by the dog, regardless of prior
knowledge of the dogs propensities; and the others, like Idaho, that adopt the common law rule
dating back to English law, which is, as expressed in J1cClain: "{U]nless the owner knew that the

beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner had such knowledge, he is liable." The following
chart outlines the position of the United States Jurisdictions:
Alabama

Strict Liability

Ala. Cod§ 3-7-1

One-Bite Rule

Alaska
Arizona

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1025
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1020

Strict Liability
One-Bite Rule

A..rkansas
California

Cal C.V. Code§ 3342

Strict Liability

Colorado

Colo. Rev. Stat. 13-21-124

Strict Liability

Connecticut

Conn. Gen Stat. § 22-357

Strict Liability

Delaware

9 Dela. Code§ 913

Strict Liability

D.C.

D.C. Code Ann.§ 8-1812

Strict Liability

Florida

Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 767.01
Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 767.04

Strict Liability

Appellants' Brief
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Georgia

GA Code Ann. § 51-2- 7

The owner or keeper of a
"vicious or dangerous'·
animal may be liable for
injuries (Caused by the dog
through careless management
or by allowing the dog to go
at liberty (off leash or
otherwise not under control)

Hawaii

Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 663-9, 663-9.1

0,vner liable if animal was
known to be dangerous, or if
plaintiff proves that owner
was negligent.
One-Bite Rule
One-Bite Rule

Idaho
Illinois

510 Ill. Cop. Stat. §5/16

Strict Liability

Indiana

Ind. Code 15-20-1-3

Strict Liability

Iowa

Iowa Code Ann. § 351.28

Strict Liability
One-Bite Rule

Kansas
Kentucky

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 258.235

Strict Liability

Louisiana

La. Civ. Code arc. 2321

Strict Liability

Maine

Me. Rev. State Ann. Tit.,§ 3961

Strict Liability

Maryland

One-Bite Rule

Massachusetts

Mass. Gen. Laws ann. Ch, 140 § 15 5

Strict Liability

Michigan

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann§ 287-351

Strict Liability

Minnesota

Minn. State Ann. § 34 7 .22

Strict Liability
One-Bite Rule

Mississippi

Missouri

Mo. Rev. Stat. 273.036

Strict Liability

Montana

Mont. Code Ann.§ 27-1-715

Strict Liability

Nebraska

Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 54-601

Strict Liability
One-Bite Rule

Nevada

Appellants' Brief
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New Hampshire

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann§ 466-19

Strict Liability

New Jersey

N.J. Stat. Ann § 4-19-16

Strict Liability

New Mexico

One-Bite Rule

New York

One-Bite Rule

North Carolina

N.C. Gen. Stat. i\nn. § 67-4-4

North Dakota

The mvner of a dangerous
dog shall be strictly liable in
civil damages for any injuries
or property damage the dog
inflicts upon a person, his
property, or another animal
One-Bite Rule

Ohio

Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 955.28

Strict Liability

Oklahoma

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 4 § 42.1

Strict Liability

Oregon

One-Bite Rule

Pennsylvania

3 Pa. Stat. § 459-502 (b)

Strict Liability

Rhode Island

R.I. Gen. Laws § 4-13-16

Strict Liability

South Carolina

S.C. Code Ann.§ 47-3-110

Strict Liability
One-Bite Rule

South Dakota
Tennessee

Ten,.11. Code Ann.§ 44-8-513

( 1) The O'-vner of a dog has a
duty to keep that dog under
reasonable control at all
times, and to keep that dog
from running at large. A
person who breaches that
duty is subject to civil
liabiliry for any damages
suffered by a person who is
injured by the dog while in a
public place or lawfully in or
on the private property of
another.
(2) Such a person may be
held liable regardless of
whether the dog has shown
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any dangerous propensities or
whether the dog's owner
knew or should have knmvn
of the dog's dangerous
propensities.

Texas
Utah

One-Bite Rule
Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1

Strict Liability

Vermont

One-Bite Rule

Virginia

One-Bite Rule

\V ashington

Wash. Rev. Code Ann.§ 16.08.040

Strict Liability

West Virginia

\V. Va. Code § 19-20-13

Strict Liability

Wisconsin

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 174.02

Strict Liability

Wyoming

One-Bite Rule

Coulter Boeschen "One-Bite" v. Strict Liability Rules for Dog Bite Injury Cases.
http://www.allaw.com/articles/nolo/personalinjury/one-bite-strict.liability-dog-bite.html.

Idaho law presents an interesting dichotomy. Idaho is a statutory strict liability state if the
dog bites about anything that moves other than a human being. Idaho Code§ 25-2806 provides:
The ovvners, possessor, or harborer of any dog or animal that kills, worries, or
wounds any livestock and poultry which are raised and kept in captivity for domestic
or commercial purposes, is liable to the 0\.vner of the same for the damages and costs
of suit, to be recovered before any court of competent jurisdiction.
Like the other thirty-one strict liability states, knowledge of abnormally dangerous
propensities, is not even an issue: if the dog injures

the owner is liable.

But what if it isn't poultry or livestock that is injured? \Vbat if it is a human being? What
then? The Boswells submit here, as they did below, that the McClain case, and the Restatement of

Torts, sets the standard. The district court gave all of Steve Boswell's arguments the short shrift with
the following:
The question presented in McClain is whether the animal has trespassed or not. If
the animal has trespassed, then the owner is strictly liable. If the animal has not
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trespassed and is lawfully where it is entitled to be, then the owner is only liable if
they have knowledge of the vicious character of the animal. 4

(R. 462, L.23-27).
With that, the trial court summarily struck all of plaintiffs arguments that were grounded in
Idaho Common Law and the Restatements. The trial court then declared that if Plaintiff had any
cause of action at all it could only be in negligence. (R. 462, L.32).
Such is not the law in Idaho. If it was, there would be no need for Idaho Code § 25-2805(2)

which provides:
Any dog which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or
otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing, is vicious. It shall be unlawful
for the o\A/ner or for the owner of premises on which a vicious dog is present to
harbor a vicious dog outside a secure enclosure. A secure enclosure is one from
which the animal cannot escape and for which exit and entry is controlled by the
O\.Vner of the premises or O\vner of the animal.
The toddler gate, that anyone can reach their hand over, is not a secure enclosure. Mary and
Amber both knew that Zoey had physically attacked before. (R.459, L.15-16).

Even by the trial

court's rendition of the law, they should have been liable for the destruction of Steve Boswell· s hand.

2.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 509 (1977) is Good Law in Idaho.
The Restatement (Second) a/Torts, § 509 (1977) provides:
( 1) A possessor a domestic animal that he knows or has reason to know has
dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm
done by the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to
prevent it from doing the harm.
(2) This liability is limited to harm that results from the abnormally dangerous
propensity of which the possessor knows or has reason to know.
Since 1970, the Idaho Supreme Court has cited the Restatement (Second )of Torts over 240

times. (See Addendum 1). Out of those 240 times, with only three exceptions5 this Court has
consistently cited the Restatement authoritatively, as a correct statement of Idaho Law.

4 Both MaPJ and Amber did have prior knowledge of Zoe's abnormaliy dangerous propensities. So why
are they not liable? Why was the case dismissed?
5

Hopper v. Swinnerton, 155 Idaho 801, 317 P.3d 698, 705 (2013), reh'g denied (Feb. 12, 2014); State v.
Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 605-06, 249 P.3d 398, 404-05 (2011); Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., Idaho 593,595,691.
P.2d 1208, 1210 (1984).
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If the Restatement (Second,; ofTorts, § 509 ( 1977) is Idaho law, then this case raises an issue
of fact as to whether Zoey' s two prior "nippings," both of which drew the blood of her victims,
constitute a "dangerous propensity abnormai to its class." If so, liability is implicated even if Mary
and Amber "exercised the utmost care to prevent it from doing the harm.'' Thus, contrary to the trial
court· s opinion, Steve Bosweli does have more than just negligence as a viable cause of action.
The trial court never addressed the Restatement, even though Idaho has, ninety-nine percent
of the time, adopted Restatemenr of Torts at every given opportunity.
The court summarily rejected, without addressing the fact, that 4 7 out of the 51 states and
the District of Columbia (48, ifldaho is included) adopt the strict liability approach in dog bite cases.
Accordingly, the law in Idaho needs to be acknowledged and the trial court's opinion needs
to be reversed.

3.

The Restatement {Third) of Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm,§ 23 (2010) is Good Law in
Idaho.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm,§ 23 (2010) provides:
i\n owner or possessor of an animal that the owner or possessor knows or has reason to know
has dangerous tendencies abnormal for the animal's category is subject to strict liability for
physical harm caused by the animal if the harm ensues from that dangerous tendency.

Restatement (I'hirdj of Torts. Phys. & Emot. Harm,§ 23 (2010).
As explained in the preceding section, this Supreme Court has all but universally adopted the

Restatement ·s position on the law as Idaho lm:v. The trial court's dealings with the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm, § 23 (2010) was to never mention it, as though the issue had
not been raised, or as though the Restatement had never been brought to the court's attention.
If the Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 23 (2007) is Idaho law, then this case also raises an
issue of fact as to whether Zoey' s t;.vo prior ··nippings" that drew the blood ofher victims, constitutes
"dangerous tendencies abnormal for the animal's category." If so, Steve Boswell has a viable cause
under the Restatement (I'hird) of Torts, § 23.
4,

The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 513 (1977) Is Good Law in Idaho.
In regards to owners of domestic animals that cause harm on their property, the Restatement

Second of Torts provides:
The possessor of an abnormally dangerous dog who keeps it upon land in his
possession, is subject to strict liability to persons coming upon the land in the
Appellants' Brief
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exercise of a privilege whether derived from his consent to their entry or otheru:ise.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 513 ( 1977).
This section of the Restatemenr presents a premises liability cause of action. It is separate
and apart from the liability pronounced in the Restarement (Second) ofTorts, § 509 and Restatement

(Third) ofTons,§ 23. According to the Restatement, it makes no difference whether Steve Boswell
was an invitee or a licensee because he \Vas in Mary Steele's home by privilege, as licensee or
invitee. 6 It makes no difference. Once again, the question arises whether Idaho will reject the

Restatement for only the fourth time in forty-plus years, or whether Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 513 ( 1977) aptly expresses Idaho law. If it is a correct statement ofldaho law, then Steve Boswell
has a viable claim for premises liability. If it does not, then an issue of fact still exists as to whether
Steve conferred a "tangible benefit" to Mary by serving her with free chauffeur services. Even
according to existing Idaho decisions, the conferral of a "tangible benefif' to Mary would make
Steve's status that of an invitee, and Mary would have the duty "to keep the premises in a reasonably
safe condition, or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers." Bates v. Eastern Idaho Regional

l'vfedical Center. 114 Idaho 252,253, 755 P.2d 1290, 1291 (1988). Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535,
347 P.2d 341 (1959). The issue of Steve's status is an issue for the jury.
In Thurmondv. Saffo, 238 Ga. App. 687,520, S.E.2d. 43 (1999), the Georgia Supreme Court
found that the injured party was but a social guest in the home. But the court nonetheless reversed
summary dismissal of a dog bite negligence action on the basis that the facts presented a jury
question as to whether the homeowner should have anticipated an attack on a guest, and whether the
homeowner should have warned the guest, or taken other actions to prevent her from being attacked.
Mary knew the dog would bite. The trial court dealt with the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 513 ( 1977) by not addressing it.

6

Idaho courts have maintained that the duty of owners and possessors of land is determined by the status
of the person injured on the land (i.e., whether the person is a invitee, licensee or trespasser). E.g., Rehwalt v.
American Falls Reservoir, Dist. No. 2, 97 Idaho 634,636, 550 P.2d 137, 139 (1976). An invitee is one who enters
upon the premises of another for a purpose connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can
reasonably be said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the
landowner. Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535,347 P.2d 341 (1959). A landowner owes an invitee the duty to keep the
premises in a reasonably safe condition, or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers. Bates v. Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center, 114 Idaho 252,253, 755 P.2d 1290, 1291 (1988).
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5.

The District Court Erred in Concluding That Neither Mary Steele Nor Amber Steele
Owed Any Duty to Steve Boswell to Protect Him from Their Vicious Dog.

The owner or harborer of a dog has duties to anyone who may come in contact with the animal. The
negligence for harboring a vicious dog is variously stated as:
[T]he failure to act upon the knowledge of an animal's abnormally dangerous
propensities establishes a breach of the duty or care owned by the owner to those that
come in contact with the animal.

Gehrts. v. Batteen, 2001 S.D. 10,620 N.W. 2d 775, 778 (2001).
It is the duty of the owner of such an animal, having knowledge of its vicious
propensities, to give notice of the propensities or to restrain the animal, and that
failure to do so is negligence that makes the owner liable for its consequences.

Stokes v. Lyddy, 75 Conn. App. 252, 265-66, 815 A.2d 263,273 (2003).
[T]he issue is whether the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff by
negligently failing to prevent a foreseeable injury.

Arbanil v. Flannery, 31 A.D.3d 588, 589, 819 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (2006).
The gist ofan action for damages by a vicious dog, whose propensities are known,
is not negligence in the manner ofkeeping the dog; it is keeping the dog at all; and
the action is founded upon the theory of maintenance of a nuisance, not negligence.
Hunt v. Hazen, 197 Or. 637, 639-40, 254 P.2d 210,211 (1953). (Emphasis added).

The essence of the action is not ownership, but the keeping and harboring of an
animal, knowing it to be vicious. One who keeps a savage dog is bound to secure
it against it doing mischief. Vide Quilty v. Battie, supra; Oakes v. Spaulding, 40 Vt.
347, 94 Am.Dec. 404; Smith v. Royer, 181 Cal, 165, 183 P. 660: }vfcClain v. Lewiston
Interstate Fair & Racing Ass 'nr 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015, 25 L.R.A., N.S. 691, 20
Ann. Cas. 60: Lanna v. Konen, 119 Conn. 646,478 A 425.
Barber v. Hochstrasser, 136 N.J.L. 76, 80, 54 A.2d 458,460 (Sup. Ct. 1947). (Emphasis added).
The defense argued, and the trial court agreed: Mary Steele was just hanging up her coat and
Amber, the owner, was not even there, so neither owed any duty to Steve. Thus, this must be all
Steve's fault. But this is not so. The duty of care goes to the keeping of the dog, including:
(a)

Keeping and harboring a vicious dog.

(b)

Failure to warn of the dog's abnormally dangerous propensities.

( c)

Failing to take reasonable precautions to secure the dog from the opportunity of
attacking, biting and mauling the Plaintiff;
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(d)

Faiiure to secure the dog in accordance with the "secure enclosure" requirements of
Idaho Code § 25-2805(2).

( e)

Failing to adequately restrain, leash, cage or othenvise secure such dog when
Defendants kne\v or had reason to know of the dog's abnormally dangerous
propensities, and could have foreseen it attacking, biting and mauling Stephen
Boswell;

(f)

Inadequately training and/or supervising and/or tending the dog;

(g)

In otherwise negligently failing to exercise that degree of care, diligence; caution and

reasonable precautions as would be demonstrated by a reasonably prudent person
under the same or similar circumstances so as to prevent any risk of foreseeable harm

to the Plaintiffs.
The law again is quite clear. You don't harbor a dog that is kno\vn to bite. If you do, you
take responsibility for its actions.
The owner or harborer who knows the dog is abnormally dangerous has a heightened duty

of care to anyone who may come in contact with the dog. The trial court erred in ruling that the
defendants owed Steve Boswell no duty of care, and in granting the defendants summary judgment.

6.

The District Court Abused its Discretion in !\laking Unwarranted Conclusions of Law
That Should Have Been Issues of Fact.
In reaching a grant of summary judgment, the district court made several unwarranted

conclusions of law. Many of these conclusions of law, are in fact, issues of fact, and those issues
of fact rightfully should be grounds for denying summary judgment to the defendants. Without the
trial court's abundant indulgence to the defense, the '"facts" would never establish a prima facie

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
For example, the court said:
The record does not reflect that Amber or Mary had (1) knowledge that Zoey was a
vicious or dangerous dog ... Although there were two incidents where Zoey had bit
or "nipped" at somebody before Mr. Boswell was attacked, neither incident was
serious enough to require medical attention or to report to the authorities.
(R. 464, L.16-19).

The trial court took away from the jury, the issue of fact as to whether two prior bites by
Zoey, \Vere notice that Zoey was abnormally dangerous. Certainly, if the trial court were correct,
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there must be caselaw out there somewhere that the court or defense counsel could cite that would
support the proposition that a "nip'' that only draws a little blood is harmless and not evidence of an
abnormally dangerous propensity.
The trial court also took from the jury the issue of fact as to whether the two prior incidents
;,,vere serious enough to report to authorities, or whether they should have been reported, but were
improperiy concealed from the authorities. The court took away from the jury the right to decide
whether the owner or harborer of an animal is excused in doing nothing, despite her superior
knowledge of the dog's temperament. In doing so, the court overreached its prerogatives.
The court then proceeded:
Chris Kettler testified that Zoey was simply being protective of Amber, as most
Scottish Terriers are. The two incidents are not enough to prove that Amber or Mary
had knowledge or put them on notice that Zoey was a vicious or dangerous dog as
defined by statute.
(R. 464, L.19-22).
Well, who is to say the dog was only being protective, or that such "protective" behavior as
biting people is appropriate and acceptable? Or who is to say that it is okay for Scottish Terriers to
engage in "protective biting" but not other breeds? Are not those issues of fact for the jury to decide
and for experts to provide guidance? Where in the record is Chris Kettler sho'wn to be an expert on
the motives of biting dogs?
Next, consider the trial court's ruling that Steve Boswell holding his hand toward Zoey, was,
as a matter of law, provocation.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that Mr. Boswell voluntarily, and on his O\\-TI accord,
approached Zoey at the gate while she was barking, and reached towards Zoey, who
was behind the gate at the time, with a closed fist. The Court concludes that the
actions of Mr. Boswell constitute provocation.
(R. 464, L.22-26).
If what Steve did to Zoey is provocation as a matter of law, then it must be that in every

instance that anyone extends a hand to a dog, the dog is warranted to viciously retaliate. Such
precedence would virtually eliminate all remedies for victims of dog bites in Idaho. If reaching
toward a dog is not always provocation, then, if, in fact, it is ever provocation must be an issue of

fact for the jurors to decide.
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Although Idaho is a common law 'one bite rule'· state, the City of Pocatello, like most of the
fifty states, is a statutory strict liability municipality. It doesn't matter if the dog has never bitten

before. or even if the dog has never growled before, the only defense is if the dog is provoked. So,
the trial court found that Zoey was provoked.
But that same ordinance defines provocation as "taunting, teasing, or threatening" the dog.
(Addendum 2; § 6.04.010: Definitions: Dangerous Animal).
Attached as Addendum 2 are Sections 6.04.010 through 6.04.060 of the Pocatello Municipal
Code. Code Section 6.04.010 gives five definitions of a dangerous animal. Those five definitions

are the only definitions of dangerous animal applicable to the ordinance. Nowhere in the Code, does
it require that the animal be previously adjudicated as vicious before it is dangerous. It is dangerous

if it meets any of the five criteria. Of particular interest are criteria 2 and 3 which provide:

2.
Any animal with a knO\vn propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack
unprovoked, to cause injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or
domestic animals or livestock; or
3.
Any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human
being or domestic animal or livestock without justifiable provocation.
Notice the connector: "or." If the dog bites without provocation, as, as Zoey did here, it is

dangerous.
If the animal is dangerous under that definition of dangerous

under the definition of dangerous -

and Zoev" was dangerous
~

then the law holds the owner responsible for its biting.

6.04.050(2)

Paragraph E provides:
E. Ovvner Liabilitv. An adult owner/custodian of a vicious animal shall be liable for
all injuries and property damage sustained by any person or domestic animal caused
by an unprovoked attack by any vicious animal, plus all costs, civil judgment or
penalties, criminal fines, final terms, and any other penalties and orders ....
The statute speaks for itself and the statute is clear. Zoey acted dangerously when she
attacked Steve Boswell. The defendants are liable for civil damages unless the dog was taunted,
teased, or tl:1reatened. It is really that simple.
At least one jurisdiction has held the exact opposite of the trial court below. At least one
jurisdiction has held that holding one's hand toward a dog, even holding one's hand toward a dog
Appellants' Brief

18

over a fence and on the dog's side of the fence, is, as a matter oflmv, not provocation. The Montana
Supreme Court considered remarkably similar issues and determined that reaching over a fence is

as a matter oflaw, not provocation under any reasonable interpretation of the term. The Court said:
Similarly, Stroop· s extending his hands and forearms into the Days' property was not
provocation. There was no testimony that Stroop thrust his hands toward the dog or
made any quick or threatening gestures. As discussed below, Stroop's hands were
lawfully on the Days' property. Mere presence on the property of another does not
amount to provocation. See Smith v. Pitchford (Ill.Ct.App. 1991), 219 Il1.App.3d
152, 161 Ill.Dec. 767, 579 N.E. 2d 24. Conduct such as Stroop resting his arms on
the fence and allowing his hands and forearms to dangle over the Days' property
cannot be considered provocation under any reasonable interpretation of that
term.
Stroop v. Day, 271 Mont. 314,319,896 P.2d 439,442 (1995). (emphasis added). Plaintiffs submit

that the Stroop opinion is the better reasoned approach, i.e. that extending one's hand toward a dog
is, as a matter of law, not provocation.
Next, consider the trial court's conclusion that Steve threatened the dog with a clenched fist.

Steve's version was that he approached the dog with the back of his hand, his fingers curled out of
the way, to allmv the dog to sniff him before touching the dog. (R. 325).
On reconsideration, the trial court summarily adopted Mary Steele's testimony, as though
undisputed, that Steve's hand \Vas across the toddler gate because that was where the blood was. (R.
483, L. 6-8).

But noone disputes that after Zoey removed the back of SteYe's hand, she wrestled

and chewed the bloody piece of skin all over the floor on her side of the toddler gate. Steve was
adamant that his hand was on his side of the gate; that Zoey reached over the gate and took off the
back of Steve's hand. (R. 219, L. 25-8 ofpp. 31-32). That too is an issue of fact for the jury.
Either, as Steve said, Mary was hanging up her coat, who sa\v nothing until Steve said, "he
bit me," or she was standing there looking on silently as Steve presented the back of his hand to the
dog. And Mary, knowing full well the dog had two priors, just stood there and watched and said
nothing until Steve lost his skin to the jaws of the dog. At a minimum, Steve's account of the facts

presents an issue of fact. The trial court summarily decided otherwise.
Then, there is the court's finding that a "nip" although it draws blood, is not evidence of an
abnormally dangerous propensity.
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Or the finding that when Steve approached the child's gate the dog was barking and
growling, when Steve's version was that the dog was "whining, wagging her tail, excited." (R. 219,
L.15 of page 32).
Or the finding that Steve did not think Mary did anything wrong, when Steve testified that
Mary should have warned him the dog would bite. (R. 230, L.4-15 of page 35).
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

The reason the word negligent \Vas used is probably because I had never been told not
to have any association with the dogs.
And it is your testimony that Mary should have somehow told you that?
I believe she should
And why:
\Vell, if she knew that the dog had bit somebody before, she should have told me.

The district court methodically went through, construed too many facts in favor of the
defense, and then found for the defense. This is not the standard for summary judgment. 1'/u:. Bee-

Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 41 P.3d 263 (2002).
7.

The District Court Erred in Striking the Affidavit of Officer Tamara Andersen.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e) governs the form of affidavits filed in support or in
opposition to motions for summary judgment. Rule 56(e) states: "[ s]upporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein." I.R.C.P. 56(e). "The Idaho Supreme Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when
reviewing a trial court's determination of the admissibility of testimony offered in connection with
a motion for summary judgment." J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311,

314, 193 P.3d 858, 861 (2008)(citing Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15, 175 P.3d
172, 177 (2007)).
In her affidavit, Officer A•.ndersen testified that she was the animal control officer who
investigated this incident; that she had been working in the profession of care and control of dogs
for at least twenty years; and that for fifteen years she had worked as an Animal Control Officer for
the City of Pocatello. (R. 79, L.1-2). Officer Andersen testified of her qualifications as nationally
certified by the National Cruelty Investigators School, Levels 1 and 2, by the University of Missouri
Law Enforcement Training Institute, including training in the fields of animal behavior, how to
approach an animal, how to handle animals safely, how to assess animal behavior and how to
determine if an animal is injured or frightened; she testified as to her certification nationally in
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dealing with animal attacks. (R. 79, L.3-7). Certainly, Officer Andersen met the "competent to
testify" standards of Rule 56( e).
Officer Andersen testified that she had reviewed the Affidavit of Chris Kettler, wherein Ms.
Kettler admitted to having been "nipped" by Zoey, and wherein she described the circumstances
surrounding the '"nip" and the bandaging of the wound. Officer Andersen testified that the incident
described by Kettler constituted a previous bite, that it constituted unnatural behavior, and shows a
dangerous propensity on the part of the dog. (R. 79, L.19-25). Officer Andersen's review of the
deposition is the kind of personal knowledge upon which experts base their opinions and would be
admissible in court.
Although Officer Andersen's affidavit meets all the requirements ofRule 56(e), the trial court
ruled it incompetent because Officer Andersen did not also state that she had examined the dog. (R.
465, L4). Rule 56(e) does not require Officer Andersen to also "make additional study of Zoey's
behavior" in order to testify whether the dog's prior bite was inappropriate for a domestic animal.
The district court abused its discretion in striking Officer Andersen's affidavit.

8.

The District Court Erred in Denying Plaintiffs the Right to Take the Deposition of John
Billquist.
John Billquist made himself a fact witness. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b )(1) provides:
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the
scope of discovery is as follows (1) Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, ...
Plaintiffs notified John Billquist, the insurance adjuster, that Zoey had bitten before -

and

his insureds knew it. That fact should have ended the case. A dog that has bitten before is liability
waiting to happen in 48 of 51 jurisdictions, and under both the Second and Third Restatements of

the Law.
Rather than concede liability, John Billquist wrote back the following:
We have reviewed the circumstances of this loss and have confirmed that in Mr.
Boswell's statements to us and to others he admitted being aware of the prior conduct
and demeanor of this dog. You mistakenly mention a prior biting incident. The
incident I believe you refer to was one where the dog was provoked by an intoxicated
individual. The dog then growled and nipped at him but did not bite.
(R. 77).
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This incident described by John Billquist is in addition to any already known by plaintiff. and
it is relevant to virtually every count of plaintiffs' claims. It is a different incident than anything
Amber Steele described in her deposition. It is different than anything Mary Steele acknowledged

.

in hers. It is extremelv, relevant to all of plaintiffs' case. It is also relevant discoverv to find out
where Mr. Billquist got his information. According to the letter of John Billquist,, the dog had
nipped at an intoxicated man that was teasing the dog. According to the deposition testimony of
Amber Steele (page 76 through 77, lines 3 through 14) and Chris Kettler, the only bitten person was

not a man, but a woman, \vas not intoxicated and was not teasing the dog. This additional incident
goes to the heart of plaintiffs' case.
The Idaho Supreme Court's position is clear; when a statement otherwise privileged, is
turned over to the opposing party, the privilege to the communication and the circumstances
surrounding it is waived.
To be a confidential communication the communication must "not be intended to be
disclosed to third persons." I.RE. 502(a)(5). Farr's argument fails because he did not
act in a manner indicating that the communication was to be confidential. The letter
was kept in PNI's files, all of which were sold to the respondents as an asset of the
corporation. Farr's failure to remove the letter constitutes a waiver of his privileged
communication claim.

Farr v. Afischler, 129 Idaho 201,207,923 P.2d 446,452 (1996).
Mr. Billquist' s letter was intended to be disclosed to third persons. It was sent to third

person(s) - plaintiffs' counsel.
Other states agree. John Billquist's disclosure is fully subject to further discovery. In
State v. Spear, 596 S.W.2d. 499 (1980) the Missouri Appellate Court said that an insurance

adjuster is perfectly susceptible to having a deposition taken as a fact witness. In Halloran v
Tousignant, 230 Minn 399, 41 N.W.2d 874 (1950) the Minnesota Supreme Court said that a

statement made by the insured to an adjuster following an accident is admissible. The trial court
had refused an offer of the testimony on the ground that the statement was a confidential
communication between attorney and client. But the statement came into the hands of the
plaintiff through an agreement benveen his and the defendant's insurance companies. The court
concluded that this arrangement waived any privilege that might othef\V'ise have been invoked.
In Sprader v 1\1ueller, 269 Minn 25, 130 N.W.2d 147 (1964) the court held that the any
privilege of a statement made by the insured to an investigator and later forwarded to her attorney
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was waived when that attorney furnished a copy of it to the assistant county attorney for further
investigation even though the privilege was asserted in a civil case. In Travelers Jndem. Co. v
Cochrane, 155 Ohio St. 305, 302, 98 N.E.2d 840 (1951 ), the court stated that while a report

made by an insured to his insurer, in anticipation of litigation, is ordinariiy privileged, in this case
the insured waived that privilege by voluntarily disclosing to others the contents of his statement
concerning the accident. In Equity Residential v. Kendall Risk 1'vlgmt.. Inc., 246 F.R.D. 557, 567
(N.D. UL 2007) the federal court ruled that once documents had already been provided
to the opposing party those documents no longer are confidential, and are thus no longer
privileged.
The list could continue, but needn't. John Biliquist, recited the incident in his letter as
though factual. The incident has direct bearing on several elements of plaintiffs case. He sent it
to plaintiffs' attorney. The Boswells have no other means than from Billquist to find out more
about the information. Plaintiffs have already tried to find out more through the defense's other
witnesses, but their stories do not agree. By rights, plaintiffs ought to be allowed to take Mr.
Billquist's deposition. At a minimum, plaintiffs ought to be allowed to introduce Mr. Billquist's
letter into evidence.
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CONCLUSION

Piaintiffs advocated to the trial court the law as delineated in Restatement (Second) of Tarts
§ 509; the Restatemenr (Third) of Torts§ 23 ,and Idaho Code §25-2805(2) concerning liability for
dog bites. The trial court avoided any mention of either Restatement or the Idaho Code by ruling,
as a matter oflaw, that Zoey' s two prior bites did not give notice to either defendant that Zoey might
bite again. The court took from the jury the right to decide otherwise.
Plaintiffs advocated to the trial court the law as delineated in Restatemem (Second) of Torts
§ 513 pertaining to premises liability of animal O\\ners. The trial court avoided any mention of the
Restatement by ignoring any distinction between an animal O\vner' s premises liability and that of any
other premises O\•mer. The trial court then ruled as a matter of law that Steve Bos\vell was only a
licensee, and that Mary owed no duty to Steve as a licensee. The court took from the jury the right
to decide otherwise.
Plaintiffs advocated to the trial court the law as delineated in Sections 6.04.010 through
6.04.060 of the Pocatello Municipal Code. These ordinances hold a dog owner liable from the very
first bite unless the dog is provoked. The trial court then ruled as a matter of law that by presenting
the dog the back of his hand, Steve Boswell provoked the dog as a matter of la\v. The court took
from the jury the right to decide othervvise.
The trial court ruled that plaintiffs had presented "no authority""expressly or implicitly" for
the one bite" strict liability rule in Idaho,(R.462, L.30-33 ) even though plaintiffs cited JkClain v.
Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Assoc 'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909): even though plaintiffs
cited the authoritative law articles discussing the lvlcClain case; and even though plaintiffs cited the
Supreme Court decisions from other states that read the j\rfcClain case the same way as plaintiffs.
Even though forty-seven of the fifty states follow some form of strict liability for dog bites, the trial
court said there is no authority for it here in Idaho. Couldn't the court have at least addressed it as
a matter of first impression?
It is overreaching the parameters ofjudicial discretion to rule, as a matter oflaw, that a closed
fist is a threat to a domestic dog, and that any dog so threatened, would be justified.

Such a

determination should be at least supported by expert testimony and left to a jury to decide. Any
while we are at it, let's let the jury decide whether it really was a "closed fist" as defendants
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advocate, or the back of the hand, as the plaintiffs advocate, when the physical evidence, i.e. the part
now missing from Steve's hand by virtue of the dog's teeth, shows convincing proof that the
plaintiffs' version of the facts at least deserves to be heard.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reafiirmed "the overriding policy is to have issues
between litigants decided on the merits.'' First Fed. Sav. Banko/Twin Falls v. Riedesel Eng 'g. Inc.,
154 Idaho 626,630,301 P.2d 632,636 (2012). That is all the Plaintiffs ask.
The Boswells ask the Idaho Supreme Court to address the status of dog bite law in Idaho, the
application of the Restatements, negligence per se for violation of Idaho Code § 25-2805(2) and
Pocatello Municipal Code§§ 6.04.010, through 6.04.060.
Finally, the Boswells ask the Idaho Supreme Court to reverse the trial court's decisions and
award plaintiffs costs and fees for having to pursue this appeal.

Respectfully submitted this

z;·,::i~fay of August, 2014.

~nt A

Higgi~s, .
Attorney for ApPellants
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POCATELLO MUNICIPAL CODE - ANIMAL CODE

6.04.010: DEFINITIONS:
As used in this chapter, each of the terms defined shall have the meanings given in this section unless
a different meaning is clearly required by the context. "Shall" is mandatory, not discretionary.
ABUSE: Any intentional, wilful, or negligent conduct resulting in bruising, bleeding, malnutrition,
dehydration, bums, fractures or breaks of any bones, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling, or death.
ADULT: Any person eighteen (18) years of age or older.
ALLO\V: To forbear or neglect to restrain or prevent, regardless of intent or participation.
ANIMAL: A mammal, bird, reptile, fish or amphibian.
ANI~1AL CONTROL CENTER: AI1y premises designated by the city for the purpose ofimpounding
and caring for animals held under the authority of this chapter.
ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER: Any person(s) employed by the city to administer and enforce the
licensing, inspection, and enforcement requirements contained within this chapter.
ANIMAL NUISANCE: Any nuisance arising out of the keeping, maintaining or 0"1ning of, or failure
to exercise sufficient control of an animal.
AT HEEL: A dog is next to a person (no more than l foot away in any direction) and obedient to that
person's command.
AT LARGE: An animal that is off the premises of the owner, and not on a leash ten feet ( l 0') or less
in length, or confined in a motor vehicle. In the case of a dangerous animal "at large" means not
confined or leashed as required in section 6.04.060 of this chapter.
COMMERCIAL ANIMAL ESTABLISHMENT: Any place of business for the care of animals,
including, but not limited to, the boarding, grooming, breeding, training, or selling of animals.
CRUELTY: Any act or omission whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering or death of an animal
is caused or permitted, including, but not limited to, failure to provide proper drink, air, space,
shelter or protection from the elements, a sanitary and safe living environment, veterinary care or
nutritious food in sufficient quantity. In the case of activities where physical pain is necessarily
caused, such as medical and scientific research, food processing, customary and normal veterina.ry
and agricultural husbandry practices, pest elimination, and animal training and hunting, "cruelty"
shall mean a failure to employ the most humane method reasonably available.

CUSTODIAN: Any person having custodial care of an animal by his or her O\.\TI choice, or at the
request of, or with the consent of, the owner of the animal, including, but not limited to, the parent( s)
or guardian(s) of a minor child.
DANGEROUS ANIMAL: A. Any animal which, when unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a
threatening manner by any person, approaches said person in an apparent attitude of attack upon the
streets, sidewalks, public grounds or places, common areas within subdivisions or mobile home or
recreational vehicle parks, commons grounds of apartment buildings, condominiums, or townhouse
developments, or private property not solely owned or possessed by the owner or custodian of the
animal.

B. Any animal with a kno\vn propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack unprovoked, to cause
injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or domestic animals or livestock; or
C. Any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human being or domestic
animal or livestock without justifiable provocation; or
D. Any animal owned or harbored primarily or in part for the purpose of fighting or any animal
trained for fighting; or
E. Any dog which has been trained as an attack dog, except dogs used by law enforcement agencies.
Exceptions: An animal will not be considered dangerous if it engages in any of the above listed
actions toward a person or animal that is either: a) committing a trespass or other tort upon the
premises of the animal's m,vner or custodian, orb) committing a crime against the animal's o\\ner
or custodian. An animal will not be considered dangerous if any of the above actions occur when the
animal is being teased, tormented, or abused, or if the actions were in reaction to either a crime
committed by a person or an attempt by the person to commit a crime.
DISPOSITION: Adoption, quarantine, voluntary or involuntary custodianship or placement, or
euthanasia humanely administered to an animal. "Disposition" includes placement or sale of an
animal to the general public or removal of an animal from any pet shop to any other location.
DOG PARK: A defined area set aside for dogs which have not been convicted of being dan2:erous
as defined in this section to exercise and play off leash in a controlled environment under the
supervision of their owners/custodians, and subject to posted rules and to the provisions of this code.
~

~

~

I[\,1POlJNDMENT: The taking into custody of an animal by any person, police officer, animal
control officer, or any authorized representative thereof.
LIVESTOCK: Cows, sheep, horses, goats, pigs, hogs, llamas, camels, donkeys, burros, and mules.
or any other similar animals whose mature size is approximately that of those set out herein.
MISUSE: The wilful or intentional causing of an animal to perform a noncustomary task, excepting
those tasks and actions required of dogs used by law enforcement agencies, which could be
dangerous or harmful to the animal or to any person.

MULTIPLE ANIMAL HOC SING: Any premises or portion thereof \Vhere three (3) or more dogs,
or more than five (5) cats, over the age of three (3) months, are kept or harbored solely for the hobby
of the ov\ner or tenant of the premises, without any pecuniary gain.
MUZZLE: A device constructed of strong, soft material or of metal, designed to fasten over the
mouth of an animal to prevent the animal from biting any person or other animai.
O\VNER: Any person having temporary or permanent custody of sheltering or having charge of,
harboring, exercising control over, or having property rights to, any animal for five (5) or more
consecutive days, or whose child, or other person over whom guardianship is exercised, who resides
with said person, so harbors or keeps an animal.
PUBLIC NUISANCE ANIMAL: Any animal that umeasonably annoys humans, endangers the life
or health of a person or another animal, or substantially interferes with the rights of a person, other
than its ownericustodian, to enjoyment of life or property.
RESEARCH FACILITY: Any college, university, or other research institution \Vhich uses live
animals in research, tests, or experiments. (Ord. 2908, 2012: Ord. 2884, 2010: Ord. 2667 § 2, 2001)

6.04.020: AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE:
1. A. Animal control officers, in addition to Pocatello police officers, are hereby authorized to carry
out the duties necessary to enforce this chapter, including licensing, inspections, and enforcement,
including issuance ofldaho uniform citations for any violations of this chapter.
B. It shall be unlawful for any person to hinder or obstruct, or attempt to hinder or obstruct, an
animal control officer in the discharge of his duties. (Ord. 2667 § 2, 2001)

6.04.030: NUISANCES PROHIBITED:
1. A. It shall be unlawful for any person to keep any animal on any property located within the city
when the keeping of such animal, or the method of keeping or harboring such animal( s). constitutes
a public nuisance or menace to public health or safety.
B. No person owning, harboring, keeping, or in charge of any animal shall cause unsanitary,
dangerous, or offensive condition( s) by virtue of the size or number of animals maintained at a single
location or due to the inadequacy of the facilities. It shall be a violation of this section if the number
of animals maintained at a single residence or the condition of the facilities is offensive, injurious,
or dangerous to the public health or the neighbors in close proximity to the premises, regardless of
whether or not a multiple animal housing license has been obtained. The animal control director shall
revoke the multiple animal housing permit of any person found in violation of this section.
C. It shall be unla\\-ful for any person to allow any animal in his/her care to become a public nuisance
animal. Conduct which renders an animal a public nuisance shall include, but not be limited to:

1. Repeated running at large (more than 2 violations).

2. Being at large in any section of a park or public recreation area without being controlled by a leash
no longer than ten feet (10') or similar physical restraint.
3. Damaging, soiling, defiling, urinating on, or defecating on any property other than that of its
ovvner.
4. Making disturbing noises, including, but not limited to, continued and repeated howling, barking,
whining, crowing, braying, or other utterances causing unreasonable annoyance, disturbance, or
discomfort to neighbors or others in close proximity to the premises where the animal is kept or
harbored.

5. Fouling of the air by noxious or offensive odors and thereby creates unreasonable annoyance or
discomfort to neighbors or others in close proximity to the premises where the animal is kept or
harbored.

6. Molesting, attacking, causing a noise disturbance, or othenvise interfering with the freedom of
movement of persons in a public right of way or on private property not its own.
7. Chasing motor vehicles in a public right of way.

8. Interfering with the enjoyment or use of another's property.
D. Any owner or custodian whose animal has become a public nuisance animal may be issued a
notice of violation and assessed the fee per occurrence as set by annual resolution of the city council,
to be paid at the animal control center. The notice of violation shall be independent of any criminal
misdemeanor or infraction proceedings which might be instituted under this section.

E. After the conviction of an owner or custodian for allowing his animal to become a nuisance for
more than two (2) running at large violations, the O\vner or custodian shall have the animal neutered
or spayed by a licensed veterinarian and provide proof to the animal control department of such
alteration \.Vithin thirty (30) days of sentencing.
F. After the conviction of an owner or custodian for allowing his animal to become a nuisance, the
owner or custodian, at his own expense, may be required by the court to successfully complete a city
approved animal obedience program with the nuisance animal, to the satisfaction of the animal
control director. (Ord. 2884, 2010: Ord. 2838 § 1, 2008: Ord. 2764 § 1, 2005: Ord. 2697 § 9, 2002:
Ord. 2667 § 2, 2001)

6.04.040: RESTRAINT AND CONFINEMENT BY OWNER/CUSTODIAN:

1. A. Dog At Large Prohibited: It is unlawful for any owner/custodian to fail to keep any dog under
restraint or to permit such animal to be at large upon the streets and public ways of the city or on
public or private property without the consent of the oVvner of the property unless the dog is under
the control of a person holding a leash no longer than ten feet ( 1O'), securely attached to the animal
and of sufficient tensile strength to restrain it, or unless the dog is confined in a motor vehicle in such
a manner that neither its clav,1s nor its teeth can extend beyond the exterior of the vehicle. Any dog
found at large may be impounded as provided hereafter in this chapter.

B. Exceptions:

1. Bartz Field: The area kno""n as Bartz Field on the Idaho State University campus may be used,
subject to rules and regulations as may be prescribed by Idaho State University, for the training or
exercise of nondangerous dogs. Nondangerous dogs within Bartz Field need not be controlled by
leash but shall be under the control of a responsible person and controlled by a whistle, noise, or
other effective command. The owner must, if requested by the police or an animal control officer or
an ISU public safety officer, prove his/her control in order to avoid impoundment of the dog.
2. Dog Parks: Any public areas officially designated as dog parks by the city of Pocatello may be
used by dogs and their O\\:ners/custodians to exercise and play off leash, subject to the provisions of
this code and any particular rules posted at the dog park. Nondangerous dogs at dog parks need not
be controlled bv. leash but shall be under the control of the O\\-ner/custodian of said do2.
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controlled by a 1vvhistle, noise, or other effective command. The owner/custodian must, ifrequested
by the police or an animal control officer, prove his/her control in order to avoid impoundment of
the dog.
C. Other Animals At Large: It is unlawful for any owner/custodian to fail to keep said animal from
being at large upon the streets and public 1vvays of the city or on public or private property without
the consent of the ov,ner of the property unless controlled by leash as provided above.
D. Location Of Dog Runs Or Kennels: No person shall maintain or construct any dog run 1vvithin
thirty feet (30') of the residence of any neighboring property.
E. Animals In Public Buildings Or Common Carriers: It is unlaVvful for a person to permit, allow,
keep, or carry any animal in, upon, or within a common carrier, public transportation facility or any
other public building or facility, particularly a building or facility in which food or drink is prepared
or stored, except that persons with disabilities shall not be denied the use of any common carrier or
public transportation facility or admittance to any cafe or any other public building or place by reason
of his being accompanied by a seeing eye or guide dog or other "assistive animal'' specially trained
for such purpose.
F. Large Animals Prohibited On Public \X/ays: No person shall lead, drive, or ride any horse, cattle
or other large animal over, across, or upon any sidewalk, parkway, or public parking area, or over
or across any public park. (Ord. 2908, 2012: Ord. 2884, 2010: Ord. 2667 § 2, 2001)

6.04.050: DANGEROUS CONDUCT BY ANLVIALS PROHIBITED;
A. Dangerous Conduct By Animal Prohibited: The oVvner or custodian of any animal which commits
any of the acts defined in this chapter as "dangerous" may be cited for a misdemeanor and the animal
control department may seize and impound the animal until the matter has been adjudicated. The
conduct shall not be deemed dangerous if the victim (person, domestic animaL or livestock) was
committing a tort against the animal's owner/custodian, or committing a trespass or other tort on the
premises of the animal's o\\-ner/custodian. Specifically prohibited are the following acts:
1. If unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a threatening manner by any person, approaching said
person in an apparent attitude of attack upon the streets, sidewalks, public grounds or places,
common areas within subdivisions or mobile home or recreational vehicle parks, common grounds

of apartment buildings. condominiums, or townhouse developments, or private property not solely
owned or possessed by the O\-vner or custodian of the animal: or
2. Biting, inflicting injury, assaulting, or otherwise attacking a human being or domestic animal or
livestock without justifiabie provocation.

B. Prohibited Animals: No person may own or harbor or have custodial care of any of the foilowing
types of vicious animals:
1. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack unprovoked, to cause
injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or domestic animals or livestock, unless
restrained andior confined as provided in section 6.04.060 of this chapter: or

2. Any animal \vhich is used primarily or in part for the purpose of fighting, or any animal trained
for fighting; or
3. Any dog which has been trained as an attack dog, except dogs used by law enforcement agencies.
C. Impoundment And/Or Destruction: Any animal whose owner or custodian has been found guilty
of or entered a plea of guilty to the offense of dangerous conduct by his/her animal is subject to
impoundment and destruction. For a first offense, the court shall set the matter for sentencing and
notify the office of the city attorney (prosecutor) of the date, time, and place of sentencing. The
prosecutor may request that the court order the destruction of the animal. If the court determines that
destruction is warranted, it shall issue an order authorizing any animal control officer or police
officer to enter the property v;here the animal is located and to seize the animal and impound it for
destruction if the animal has not been voluntarily surrendered by five o'clock (5:00) P.M. on the date
of sentencing.
D. Subsequent Violations:
1. Upon the conviction or plea of guilty to a second or subsequent offense of dangerous animal
conduct, regardless of the form of the current or any prior judgment, if the subsequent conduct
involved the animal being dangerous, the court shall order destruction of the animal. If the court
determines that destruction is \Varranted, it shall issue an order authorizing any animal control officer
or police officer to enter the property where the animal is located and seize the animal and impound
it for destruction if the animal has not been voluntarily surrendered by five o'clock (5:00) P.~L on
the date of sentencing.
2. If the subsequent conduct did not involve the animal being dangerous, the court may, but is not
required to, order destruction of the animal regardless of the form of the current or prior judgment.
E. Owner Liability: An adult owner/custodian of a dangerous animal shall be liable for all injuries
and property damage sustained by any person or by any animal caused by an unprovoked attack by
any dangerous animal, plus all costs, civil judgments or penalties, criminal fines, final terms,
veterinary fees, shelter impound fees, and any other penalties and orders. In the event that the
owner/custodian of the dangerous animal is a minor, the minor's parent or guardian shall be so liable.
F. Failure To Surrender Animal: It shall be a separate offense to fail to surrender an animal for
impoundment and/or destruction. {Ord. 2884, 20 l 0: Ord. 2838 § 2, 2008: Ord. 2764 § 3, 2005: Ord.
2667 § 2, 2001)

6.04.060: RESTR.\.INT AND CARE OF DANGEROUS

A. Restraint Requirements: The owner/custodian of any animal convicted of a violation of the
dangerous conduct prohibitions set out in this chapter shall complete the requirements of this
subsection and subsection B of this section within thirty (30) days of the date of such conviction.
Every dangerous animal shall be securely confined by its o\vner/custodian within a building or secure
enclosure as set out herein, and whenever off the premises of its O\vner/custodian, shall be either
caged or securely muzzled and restrained by an adult with a chain or tether having a minimum tensile
strength of three hundred (300) pounds and not more than three feet (3') in length, and shall be under
the direct control and supervision of the adult owner 1custodian of the dangerous animal. Every
person harboring a dangerous animal is charged with an affirmative duty to confine the animal in
such a way that persons and other animals do not have access to such animal. To be considered
secure, a facility must be constructed in a manner capable of containing the animal. It shall be a
completed structure with a securely attached roof of durable material which is secured to a
foundation or concrete pad, or it shall be a chainlink structure which includes a securely attached
roof, and which is embedded into the ground to a depth of no less than one foot (1 '). Both the
completed structure and the chainlink structure shall be at least six feet (6') in height and shall
include a locking mechanism which shall be kept locked at all times the animal is "vithin said
facility.
B. Signage: The O\vner 1custodian of a dangerous animal shall display in a prominent place on the
premises a clearly visible warning sign indicating that there is a dangerous animal on the premises,
with lettering large enough to be read from the adjacent public right of way. A second warning sign
must be posted on the facility in which the animal is kept.
C. Compliance Enforcement Authority: Animal control officers are empowered to make whatever
inquiry is necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of this chapter, and may seize and
impound any dangerous animal \,Vhose owner fails to comply with the provisions of this chapter.

D. Microchip Implantation And Alteration Required: Any person who has been found guilty of or
pied guilt'/ to a violation of the dangerous conduct prohibitions set out above shall, within five (5)
days of conviction, have a microchip implanted in the animal by a licensed veterinarian or the animal
control department, pay all associated costs, and, for work performed by a veterinarian, provide proof
to the animal control department that the microchip has been implanted. In addition, the owner or
custodian shall have the animal spayed or neutered by a licensed veterinarian and shall provide proof
to the animal control department of such alteration within thirty (30) days of the conviction.
E. Notification To Animal Control: The owner1custodian of a dangerous animal shall notify the
animal control department within twenty four (24) hours if said dangerous animal is at large, is
unconfined, has attacked another animal or a human being, has temporarily or permanently relocated
to another address, or has died, been sold or given away. If the dangerous animal has been sold or
given away, the O\\-ner/custodian shall also provide the animal control department with the name,
address and telephone number of the new owner/custodian of the dangerous animal, within twenty
four (24) hours.
F. Impoundment: If a dangerous animal whose owner or custodian has previously been found guilty

of or pled guiity to a violation of the dangerous conduct prohibitions in this chapter, regardless of
the form of the prior or currentjudgment(s), is alleged to have committed a subsequent violation of

section 6.04.050 or 6.04.040 of this chapter or this section, or is found to be at large, the animal
control department shall seize and impound the animal until the matter has been adjudicated. The
owner 1custodian of the animal shall be responsible for all cost of impound fees, medical care, and
other expenses for said animal while it is in custody with the Pocatello Animal Shelter, and the
ovmer/custodian shall pay all such impound fees, medical care, and other expenses within five (5)
days of the sentencing, or animal control may dispose of the animal, including. but not limited to,
adoption or destruction, without further notice to the o""ner/custodian.
G. Cash Bond Required:
1. If any animal is seized under this section or any other section of this chapter, the 0'Aner or
custodian of said animal shall be liable for the reasonable costs of the seizure and the care, keeping,
and disposal of the animal. Reasonable costs shall include, but shall not be limited to, transportation,
medical, board, shelter, and farrier costs.
2. If any animal is in the possession of, and being held by the city of Pocatello pending the outcome
of a criminal action charging a violation of this chapter, prior to final disposition of the criminal
charge, the city of Pocatello may file a petition in the criminal case requesting that the court issue
an order forfeiting the animal to the city of Pocatello. The petitioner shall serve a true copy of the
petition upon the defendant.
3. Upon receipt of a petition pursuant to subsection G2 of this section, the court shall set a hearing
on the petition. The hearing shall be conducted within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the
petition. The hearing shall be limited to the question of forfeiture of the animal.
4. At a hearing conducted pursuant to subsection G3 of this section, the petitioner shall have the
burden of establishing probable cause to believe that the animal was subjected to conduct which
constitutes a violation of this chapter, or that the animal has committed a violation of this chapter.
A prior finding of probable cause to proceed on the criminal case will create a permissive
presumption that probable cause exists for the forfeiture proceeding. After the hearing, if the court
finds probable cause exists, the court shall order immediate forfeiture of the animal to the petitioner,
unless the defendant, within seventy two (72) hours of the hearing, posts a cash bond with the
municipal treasurer in an amount determined by the court to be sufiicient to repay all reasonable care
of animal costs incurred, and anticipated to be incurred, for the care of the animal up to the time set
for trial on the criminal case. If, after the hearing, the court finds that no probable cause exists, the
animal shall be returned to the mvner/custodian, and the o"vner/custodian shall not be responsible
for any care of animal costs unless the person later pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation
of this chapter, at which time the defendant shall owe all care of animal costs as restitution to the city
of Pocatello in the criminal case.
5. At the end of the time for which expenses are covered by the cash bond, if the O\vner/custodian
desires to prevent disposition of the animal, the o""ner/custodian shall post a new cash bond with the
municipal treasurer which must be received before the expiration date ofthe previous cash bond. The
court may correct, alter or otherwise adjust the new cash bond upon a motion made before the
expiration date of the previous cash bond, provided, however, no person may file more than one
motion seeking an adjustment to the new cash bond.

6. If a cash bond has been posted in accordance with this subsection, the city of Pocatello may draw
from that cash bond reasonable care of animal costs in keeping and caring for the animal from the
date of the seizure to the date of final disposition of the animal in the criminal action.
7. At the end of the time for which care of animal costs are covered by the bond, if no additional cash
bond has been posted in accordance with this subsection, the city of Pocatello may determine
disposition of the animal. The owner/custodian of the animal shall be liable for all unpaid reasonable
care of animal costs. Posting of the cash bond shall not prevent the city of Pocatello from disposing
of the seized or impounded animal before the expiration of the period covered by cash bond if the
court orders the forfeiture of the animal or the owner relinquishes the animal.
8. Upon resolution of the criminal action, including any appeal(s), regardless of the court's decision
of guilt or iri.nocence, remaining funds deposited with the municipal treasurer which have not, and
will not be expended for care of animal costs, shall be remitted to the owner/custodian of the animal.
9. Regardless of any other provision of this section, if in the wTitten determination of a licensed
veterinarian the animal is experiencing extreme pain or suffering, or is severely injured or diseased
and therefore not likely to recover, the animal may be immediately euthanized.
10. No proceeding under this section shall be used as a basis for a continuance or to delay the
criminal case nor shall proceedings in the criminal case, other than dismissal, be used as a basis to
delay or continue the forfeiture proceeding as provided for in this section. Proceedings under this
section are of a civil nature and governed by the Idaho rules of civil procedure except as to
limitations upon the discovery process. Due to the need to conduct any proceeding necessary under
this section in an expeditious manner and the right of any criminal defendant to avoid selfincrimination, any and all discovery requests shall be granted only under authority of the court.
Discovery mechanisms shall not include the deposition of any party, 'vvitness, or representative, the
use of interrogatories, requests for admission, or the demand to inspect any records outside the
irnmediate reports and financial accountings for the animal in question.
11. "Care of animal costs" include, but are not limited to, costs of transportation, medical care, food,
shelter, boarding, impound fees, disposal fees, and farrier fees. (Ord. 2894, 2011: Ord. 2884, 2010)

6.04.070: ANIMAL BITES; NOTIFICATION
A. When an o~ner/custodian of an animal has knowledge that his or her animal has bitten a human

being, a pet, domestic animal, or livestock, such owner or custodian shall immediately notify
personnel at the animal control center or the police department of the time and circumstances of such
bite, and the name and address of the person bitten, if known, and the precautionary provisions in
regard to rabies set out in this chapter shall be followed.
B. When any person, including doctor, veterinarian, or medical facility staff, has information that
a person or domestic animal or livestock has been bitten by another animal, he or she shall
immediately notify personnel at the animal control center or police department and the precautionary
provisions in regard to rabies set out in this chapter shall be follm,ved. (Ord. 2667 § 2, 2001 J

